In a previous essay, we lamented that Mighty Casey had struck out. Maybe what is needed is not another Casey, but fixing Mudville. That means changing our expectations of good governance and then doing something about a reduced menu of expectations. There are many sources of our disaffection with government. Our political fragmentation, however, assures us that there is not a single silver bullet. As a country we have very different expectations concerning what our Government should provide for us.

From an historical perspective, what we wanted in 1776 and later in 1787 was that Government should insure our liberty and our freedom. Those were simpler times and the Founding Fathers prescribed a stronger national government that could marshal the resources to defend our nation and protect us from violent uprisings internally. The Philadelphia convention of 1787 was highly fearful of the outbreak of domestic uprising, coming as it did shortly after Shays Rebellion was put down only through a massive effort by the State of Massachusetts.

The Founders wanted an orderly state, hopefully not torn apart by faction. Federalist #10 (Madison) was devoted to just that issue: factionalism, and how the separate sovereignty of the 13 States coming together in a Union would provide a protection against factionalism. The Fathers were also strongly aware of the precarious nature of our finances. The Continental Congress had made long-term sufferers out of its own Army by its failure to raise sufficient resources to pay the Army and its officers. After the Constitution was written, Hamilton, as the first Treasury Secretary, federalized the separate States’ debt thereby creating a viable financial system that could support the new Government and its armed forces. Tax revenues then came largely from taxes on trade—tariffs! It would not be until the 20th century that the US turned to personal income taxation. In spite of the brilliance of our Founders, history must judge their failure to place term limits on the legislature as a strategic error.

Term limits were thoroughly discussed during the deliberations in Philadelphia and while some limits had been in effect under the Articles of Confederation, they disappeared completely in the final draft of the Constitution. Even from Madison’s voluminous notes, it is unclear how this omission was contrived. Government was smaller and stayed smaller, absent the Civil War, until the advent of the Great Depression. Perhaps the small size of the actual government and the limited scope of its interests at the Federal level dictated that outcome? We cannot be sure.

The size and extent of Government’s intervention into private endeavors is very much at the source of the observed cronyism and corruption that so disfigures our current governance. It might seem strange that government size would be a source of corruption, given that smaller states also suffer the malady. Consider, however, the nature of any Government effort, either through specific legislative enactment or through the rules of a government agency designated by that legislation.

The bureaucracy writes the rules and largely interprets them even though the formal legal structure comes from the Congress and is signed by the President. Each activity that is so described by the legislation both prohibits or directs that private actors, firms, households, individuals, associations, NGO’s —all domiciled in the private sector—are to undertake an activity or to forsake an activity under the sanction of a Government regulation.

Each such regulation sets up incentives to abide by the directives but the regulation also implicitly sets up a shadow price that measures the value of non-compliance to the regulation. Thus, regulations set up incentives for behavior of agents in the private sector and clearly these agents respond to these incentives. Then comes the investigation of such deviations and the enforcement by the specific government bureau or agency designated to compel private behavior. How do markets respond to these incentives?

Largely, in the US, it is first by lobbying efforts paid for by affected private agents. The lobbying can take place in the designated bureau and/or it can take place in front of particular legislators. Here a quid pro quo often occurs. Private agents want a “seat at the table,” and they are wiling to purchase the necessary admission tickets. They can contribute directly to a sympathetic legislator’s campaign to purchase that seat at the table.

The absence of term limits has created many permanent politicians, each of whom requires resources to maintain his elected status. Markets work—often all too effectively—and we then observe special interests buying tickets to the cronyism and corruption circus. The circus never pulls down its tent. It is a permanent fixture of expanding government interference in the affairs of the private sector.

Now Mudville complains that its true wishes are not heard, that no one in Washington really hears what they want. That’s tinder for a political candidate willing to state he hears the cries of the disaffected. Sound familiar? Clearly, no joy in Mudville. Instead, we have frustrated grievances by a great many angry voters. Can representative government survive this tumult? One has to wonder?